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February 1966] Recent Developments 
"Runaway Shop" Must Bargain With Union Upon 
Request at New Site Whether or Not Union 
Reacquires Its Majority Status-
Garwin Corporation* 
741 
The sole stockholder of the Garwin Corporation, a New York 
apparel manufacturer, caused a similar manufacturing company to 
be incorporated in Florida. The Garwin Corporation then termi-
nated its New York operations, discharged its employees, and re-
sumed operations at the Florida location. The International Ladies' 
Garment Workers' Union, which represented a majority of the 
discharged employees, filed a complaint with the National Labor 
Relations Board, alleging that the Garwin Corporation had violated 
sections 8(a)(l), (3) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act 
because the relocation was motivated by anti-union animus and 
because the discharged employees were deprived of their rights 
• 4 CCH I.AB. L. REP. If 950!1 (NLRB June 28, 1965), petition to review and modify 
docketed, No. 19478, D.C. Cir., 1965 (hereinafter cited as principal case). 
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guaranteed by section 7 of the act.1 In addition, the union charged 
that the company had independently violated section 8(a)(5) by 
failing to bargain about the decision to move and about the effects of 
the relocation on the employees at the New York site. The Board 
found that the company had committed the alleged unfair labor 
practices and, as a remedy for the section 8(a)(l) and (3) violations, 
ordered the employer to cease and desist from the violations and to 
offer reinstatement with back pay to the New York employees at the 
old plant, if it were reopened, or at the new one, if the employer 
elected to remain there. To remedy the section 8(a)(5) violations, the 
Board ordered the employer to bargain "on request" with the union 
at the new site whether or not it represented a majority of the em-
ployees there.2 However, the Board stated that any collective bar-
gaining agreement resulting from the order to bargain would bar a 
certification petition of another union for only one year unless the 
ILGWU could reestablish its majority within that time in Florida.8 
In recent years, more and more employers have moved their 
industrial operations to locales which lack union organization and 
which have low wage scales.4 In determining whether any of the 
employer activities associated with these relocations constitute un-
fair labor practices, the Board and the courts must weigh the inter-
ests of the respective parties--management's right to make economic 
decisions, the unions' need for self-preservation, and the employees' 
right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choice.5 Thus, it has been held that an employer does not violate 
the act if the relocation is made primarily for economic reasons,0 
I. Sections 8(a)(l), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 
49 Stat. 449, 452, 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(l), (3), (5) (1964), provide in pertinent 
part: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(!) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 7 .••• 
(3) by discrimination ••• to encourage or discourage membership in any labor 
organization •.•• 
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of [the] • • • em• 
ployees •••• 
Section 7 of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended by the Labor Management 
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964), provides 
that "employees shall have the right to self-organization [and] ••• to bargain collec• 
tively through representatives of their own choosing." 
2. Principal case at 16003. 
3. Ibid. Normally a collective bargaining agreement negotiated with the elected 
union representative bars the filing of an election petition for three years. See, e.g., 
General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962); Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp 8: Paper 
Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990 (1958). 
4. See generally Note, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 136, 137 (1961): Saturday Evening Post, The 
Fight for Industries Is Rough in Some Places, April 9, 1960, p. 10; U.S. News and 
World Report, Why Big Business Is Going "Small Town," Dec. 21, 1959, p. 89. 
5. See generally Comment, 7 VILL. L. REv. 450, 452 (1962). 
6. See, e.g., NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 {2d Cir. 1961): NLRB v. 
Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961): NLRB v, 
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but does commit an unfair labor practice whenever, as in the prin-
cipal case, the plant relocation is motivated in whole or in part by 
anti-union animus.7 Nevertheless, even if the employer has valid 
economic reasons for the relocation, he commits an unfair labor 
practice if he fails to notify the union of his decision to move and 
fails to bargain about the effects of the relocation on the employees 
at the original site.8 
In fashioning appropriate remedies for these unlawful reloca-
tions, which are often referred to as "runaway shops,"9 the Board's 
primary objective has been to restore the status quo ante.10 Al-
though it might seem that implementation of this objective would 
produce a number of diverse remedies, the Board has in fact estab-
lished a definite remedial pattern. When the operations are moved 
only a relatively short distance, the Board prescribes the same 
remedy that it uses in all other cases where an employer directly 
causes the loss of a union's majority:11 the employer is ordered to 
offer the employees reinstatement with back pay and to bargain 
upon request with the union which has been representing his em-
ployees.12 On the other hand, if the case involves a long-distance 
move, the Board has, at least prior to the principal case, permitted 
the employer to choose between two alternative courses of action: 
(1) resume operations at the abandoned plant, offer reinstatement 
with back pay to the employees, and bargain with their union rep-
resentatives; or (2) remain at the new site, offer reinstatement with 
back pay to the employees, and, conditioned upon proof of its ma-
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954); Brown Truck & 
Trailer Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953). 
7. See, e.g., Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547 (1961), enforced per curiam, 305 
F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962); Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162 (1957), enforced 
per curiam, 272 F.2d 184- (6th Cir. 1959). 
8. See NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 212 (1960), enforced in part, 
293 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Standard Handkerchief Co., 4 CCH LAB. L. 
REP. n 9101 (NLRB Feb. 15, 1965). In addition, the employer may have to bargain. 
about the actual decision to relocate. See note 25 infra. 
9. See 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. 1l 3795. "Runaway shops" must be distinguished from 
total liquidations of a business, since the United States Supreme Court has held that an 
employer may close his "entire business," even if the liquidation is motivated by vin-
dictiveness toward the union. Textile Workers _v. Darlington Co., 380 U.S. 263, 272-74 
(1965). In the principal case the Board adopted the Trial Examiner's finding that the 
Florida corporation was merely the alter ego of the New York corporation; therefore, 
the business was not really "liquidated." See principal case at 15998. 
10. See, e.g., Jacob H. Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746, 778 (1939), modified, 29 N.L.R.B. 14 
(1941). See generally Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188-200 (1941). 
11. See, e.g., NLRB v. Warren Co., 350 U.S. 107 (1955); Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 
321 U.S. 702 (194-4); Delight Bakery, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 893 (1964); Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 
85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), modified and enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
12. See Rapid Bindery, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 212 (1960) (60-mile move); New Madrid 
Mfg. Co., 104- N.L.R.B. 117 (1953) (31-rnile move); Rome Products Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 
1217 (1948) (Hl0-mile move). The justification for the use of this remedy is that the 
employees can accept the offer of reinstatement without substantial inconvenience to 
themselves. 
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jority status, bargain with the union.18 Thus, it is apparent that the 
compulsory bargaining order in the principal case is a significant 
departure from the traditional remedial order for a long-distance 
"runaway shop." 
To remedy unfair labor practices, the Board is required to issue 
a cease-and-desist order and is empowered to take any other affirma-
tive action which will effectuate the policies of the act,14 so long as 
it is not punitive.15 Section 1 of the act specifically states that the 
statutory policies are to mitigate and eliminate obstructions to the 
free flow of commerce, to encourage collective bargaining, and to 
protect the employees' right to freedom of association and self-orga-
nization.16 In addition, the United States Supreme Court has sug-
gested that one purpose of the act is to prohibit discriminatory use 
of economic weapons which are designed to obtain future benefits 
for the employer and to discourage future collective action by the 
employees.17 
In light of these purposes and policies, the Board's conditional 
bargaining order, the remedy used prior to the principal case, does 
not seem to "remedy" a l_ong-distance "runaway shop." In the first 
place, back-pay awards are usually insufficient to compensate em-
ployees who have been discharged as a result of the relocation.18 
Second, former employees are usually unwilling to uproot them-
selves and their families in order to accept reinstatement at a new 
location,19 and employers are not likely to return to their abandoned 
plants. Thus, collective bargaining between the principal parties is 
completely destroyed. Third, the conditional bargaining order al-
lows an employer to utilize the economic weapon of plant reloca-
tion to establish and retain a non-union plant, which is usually the 
primary objective of his move.2° Fourth, the requirement that the 
employer must give notice of a decision to move and bargain about 
the effects of the move is in no way enforced by the conditional bar-
gaining order. Finally, the order does not deter other anti-union 
employers who might want to relocate in the future. 
13. See, e.g., Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 556 (1961), enforced per curiam, 
305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962); Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 174 (1957), 
enforced per curiam, 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959); Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 
N.L.R.B. 480, 501 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir, 1954). 
14. See NLRA § IO(c), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964). 
15. See Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961); 
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940). 
16. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964). 
17. See Textile Workers v. Darlington Co., 380 U.S. 263, 271 (1965). 
18. See Farber, Reversion to Individualism: The Back-Pay Doctrines of the NLRB, 
7 !ND. & LAB. REL. REv. 262 (1954). 
19. See MAcDONALD, LABOR PROBLEMS AND TIIE AMERICAN SCENE 271 (1938); Farber, 
supra note 18, at 268. 
20. Sec Note, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1100 (1964); Note, 112 u. PA. L. REv. 69 (1963): 
Comment, 7 VILL. L. REv. 450 (1962). 
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The remedy employed in the principal case, which requires rec-
ognition of the union at the new site, is obviously better than the 
conditional bargaining order. It more effectively restores the status 
quo ante because the union is still the certified bargaining agent, 
the position it occupied prior to the unlawful plant removal. It may 
also provide a nonpunitive means by which the Board can deter 
other unlawful relocations. Nevertheless, the remedy in the princi-
pal case does not fully effectuate the purposes and policies of the 
act.21 Since a compulsory bargaining order in the context of a long-
distance relocation compels all of the new employees to be repre-
sented by a union which they may not desire, those employees are 
inhibited in their right of self-organization and in their freedom to 
choose a majority representative, in direct contravention of the poli-
cies of section 7 .22 In addition, the order does not remedy the in-
fringement upon the right of the employees at the old site to bar-
gain about the effects of the move prior to the time of the actual 
relocation, although the employer may still be subject to a breach-
of-contract suit if there is a provision in the old contract prohibit-
ing relocation.28 Furthermore, it should be noted that the reasoning 
of the United States Supreme Court in its recent decision in Fibre-_ 
board Paper Products Co. v. NLRB24 could be extended so as to re-
quire an employer to bargain about the actual decision to relocate.25 
If such an expanded duty to bargain is recognized, then neither the 
compulsory bargaining order nor the conditional bargaining order 
would be a realistic remedy for violations of that duty. 
There have been a number of other suggested remedies for long-
distance "runaway shops," but each seems to be as unsatisfactory as the 
conditional bargaining order and the compulsory bargaining order. 
For example, the requirement that the Board's remedies be nonpuni-
tive26 would appear to preclude severance pay awards27 and criminal 
sanctions.28 An order to move back and reopen the old plant might re-
21. See 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 997 (1965); 41 NoTRE DAME LAw. 267 (1965). 
22. See NLRA § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 157 (1964). 
23. See United Shoe Workers of America v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 509 
(E.D. Pa. 1960), modified, 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962). 
24. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
25. In Fibreboard, supra note 24, the Supreme Court held that an employer must, 
in some circumstances, bargain about the decision to subcontract. The Court's rationale 
suggests that other management decisions which may have an effect on employment 
conditions are mandatory subjects of bargaining. See generally 74 YALE L.J. 1472, 
1476-77 (1965). In one case, White Consol. Indus., Inc., 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. If 9704 
(NLRB Sept. 24, 1965), the union raised the issue, but the :Board dismissed the com-
plaint, stating that "the Union did not object to Respondent's plans or request bargain-
ing with respect to either the decision or its impending effect upon unit employees 
•••• " Id. at 16451 n.l. (Emphasis added.) 
26. See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
27. See Farber, supra note 18, at 268. 
28. See SUBCOMM. ON NLRB OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 87TH 
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store the exact status quo ante,29 but it too appears punitive because 
a financial burden would be placed on the employer which is out of 
proportion to the injury caused to the employees at the old site.80 
In addition, an outright order to return might actually interfere 
with interstate commerce rather than promote it as the NLRA re• 
quires.31 Although these criticisms might be answered if the Board 
encouraged relocation of the old employees by requiring the em• 
player to pay higher incentive wages, to pay relocation costs, and to 
guarantee transfer of earned seniority rights,32 it is doubtful that 
enough employees could be persuaded to move to the new site to 
continue the union's majority representation. In any event, it would 
appear unjust to place the burden of remedying the employer's un-
fair labor practice on innocent employees and their families. 
Although all of the Board's post-relocation remedies can be crit-
icized for either practical or legal reasons, it appears that the Board 
can remedy "runaway shops" under existing law by controlling them 
prior to relocation. Section IOG) of the act authorizes the Board to 
seek appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order from a fed-
eral district court whenever it issues a complaint charging that any 
person "has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice."88 
Therefore, if a complaint is filed with the Board prior to the actual 
plant relocation, the Board can petition the court for an order re-
quiring bargaining and maintenance of the status quo. The advan-
tages of such an order are obvious. First, it would prohibit the em-
ployer from moving out machinery or terminating his lease and then 
claiming economic hardship as a defense to a later attempt by the 
Board to force him to return to his old plant. Second, it would 
strengthen the job security of the employees at the old site and en-
sure collective bargaining about the effects of an economically mo-
CONG., lsr SESs., HEARINGS ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAnoR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
Acr BY THE NLRB pt. 1, at 27-28 (Comm. Print. 1961) [hereinafter cited as PUCINSKI 
REPORT]. 
29. In the principal case, the union requested this remedy at the hearing before the 
Board, see principal case at 16000, and is also seeking this remedy in its petition to 
review and modify the Board's order. 
30. But see 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 997, 1002 (1965). 
31. See Jacob H. Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939), modified, 29 N.L.R,B. 14 (1941). 
32. See generally Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd on other 
grounds, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), reversing 185 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Aaron, Reflec-
tions on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REv. 
1532 (1962); Note, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1100 (1964). 
33. 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § l60{j) (1965). Critics have repeatedly asserted 
that the injunctive provisions of the act are unfairly weighted against labor unions. 
See PucrnsKI REPORT, op. dt. supra note 28, at 27-52, However, Chairman McCulloch 
has declared that the Board intends to utilize the injunctive procedures more fully. 
See Address by Chairman McCulloch, Eighth Annual Joint Industrial Relations Con-
ference, Michigan State University, 49 L.R.R.M. 74 (April 19, 1962); Jay, What Is New 
in the Labor Injunction?, N.Y.U. 15TH ANN. CoNF. ON LAnoR 266 (1963). Sec generally 
id. at 261-78. 
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tivated move. Third, it might eliminate the necessity of a later in-
fringement on the right of the employees at the new site to choose 
their ovm bargaining representative. Since legislative history clearly 
indicates that section 100) was enacted to provide a means of ob-
taining speedy relief and to maintain the status quo in any case 
where the Board would otherwise be unable to correct an unfair 
labor practice until after substantial injury had been inflicted,84 it 
would seem that the "runaway shop" situation is an appropriate 
place for its use.85 
Although the Board can seek only temporary relief under section 
100) if the particular union involved or an employee at the old site 
files an unfair labor practice charge,86 it seems doubtful that an em-
ployer could act so quickly or so surreptitiously that a union or an 
employee would be unable to file charges until after the relocation.37 
If it appears that the employer is contemplating a plant relocation, 
a complaint should be filed alleging that the employer has taken 
some concrete action, such as building a new plant or incorporating 
in another state, that the company has failed to give notice of its 
intention to move, that a demand has been made upon the employer 
to bargain, that the employer has ignored that demand, and that 
such behavior constitutes a refusal to give notice and to bargain 
about the effects of a contemplated relocation, in violation of section 
8(a)(5).88 If .the employer believes that he has valid economic rea-
sons for the move and· that he has not otherwise committed an un-
fair labor practice, he should then be allowed to present affidavits 
and financial statements to the district court to indicate that the 
granting of an injunction or other temporary relief is not war-
ranted.89 
34. See NLRB v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 48 CCH LAB. CAS. 11 18424 
(W.D. La. 1963); Boire v. Tiffany Tile Corp., 47 CCH LAB. CAS. 1[ 18235 (M.D. Fla. 
1963); S. REP. No. 104-, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947). 
35. Only one case has been found in which a district court actually enjoined a 
company from moving its operations before a determination by the Board of the merits 
of the complaint. Getreu v. Gas Appliance Supply Corp., Civil No. 5291 (S.D. Ohio 
1963), 28 NLRB ANN. REP. 145 (1963). Cf. Peerless Woolen Mills, 49 L.R.R.M. 82-83 
(10th Cir. 1961); Phillips v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 49 L.R.R.M. 2144 (N.D. Ga. 1961). 
36. See NLRA § IO(j), added hy 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) 
(1964). 
37. In the principal case, rumors of the move reached union officials in May 1963. 
Although the. employer denied union suggestions that a relocation was pending, he· 
did close down and move in July. Principal case at 15998. For further illustrations, 
see Standard Handkerchief Co. v. NLRB, 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 11 9101 (Feb. 15, 1965) 
(union knew employer was moving machinery out of the plant for more than two 
weeks); Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547 (1961), enforced per curiam, 305 F.2d 
825 (3d Cir. 1962) (employees and -union knew of a building being erected in another 
state even though the employer denied that the company was planning to move); 
Rome Products Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948) (employees had four days' notice before 
the move); Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937, enforced per curiam, 116 F.2d 281 
(8th Cir. 1940) (employees feared an impending move ten days before the move). 
38. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964). 
39. Phillips v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 49 L.R.R.M. 2144 (N.D. Ga. 1961). In 
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When a temporary injunction is granted by a district court, the 
Board's mvn procedural rules require it to hold hearings on the un-
fair labor practice charge "expeditiously" and to give the case 
priority.40 If the Board determines that the relocation is, in fact, 
not economically motivated or that the employer has not given no• 
tice of its decision to move and has not bargained about the effects 
of the move, the Board can then issue a permanent cease-and-desist 
order and require bargaining. Even if the relocation appears eco-
nomically motivated, the Board may still order the employer to bar-
gain about the effects of the move on the employees at the old site. 
In addition, if the duty to bargain about the actual decision to relo-
cate is ultimately recognized,41 section lOG) will enable the Board 
to enforce that duty at the appropriate time. Thus, even though an 
employer may be required to delay temporarily a contemplated re-
location, the temporary restraining order assures satisfaction of his 
bargaining duties--a result which no post-relocation remedy can 
satisfactorily achieve. 
Conceivably, the Garwin case could be reversed on appeal solely 
on the issue of whether there was an unfair labor practice. It is more 
likely, however, that the determinative issue will concern the validity 
of the Board's new remedy for a long-distance "runaway shop." 
Since the compulsory bargaining order more effectively promotes 
the purposes and policies of the act than does the conditional bar-
gaining order, it should be enforced. On the other hand, it is appar• 
ent that no post-relocation remedy can repair the injury that is 
inflicted upon the union and the employees at the original site and 
still protect the rights of the employees at the new site. Consequently, 
the Board should in the ~ture promote greater use of the temporary 
relief available under section lOG). While some courts may be reluc• 
tant to restrain a relocation until the Board determines whether an 
employer has fulfilled his duties to his employees, a temporary in• 
junction coupled with a bargaining order seems to effectuate the 
policies of the act. It promotes collective bargaining; it protects the 
rights of the employees at both the old and the new site to be repre-
sented by bargaining representatives of their o,vn choice; and it 
allows the Board to act against unfair labor practices at a time when 
they can be most appropriately remedied. 
that case, the court denied an injunction because the employees could receive no 
benefit from continued operation of an insolvent concern. 
40. 8 NLRB: STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURE, RULES AND REGULA'IlONS pt. G, in 29 
C.F.R. § 102.94 (1965). If the Board refuses to act, the district court may dissolve the 
injunction. See Getreu v. ITU, 50 L.R.R.M. 2266 (S.D. Ohio 1962). 
41. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
